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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
I. SOUTH CAROLINA WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT
A. Residence Requirement for Occupational Disease
Compensation
In Vespers v. Springs Mills, Inc.,' the South Carolina Su-
preme Court interpreted the jurisdictional requirements of the
Workmen's Compensation Act for pulmonary diseases. The
court held that the statutory exposure requirement referred to
exposure in the same type of employment and not to exposure
solely within the state.2 This decision places South Carolina in
the small minority of jurisdictions that have ruled on the issue.
3
The claimant in Vespers was exposed to the hazards of cot-
ton dust in her employment in North Carolina for seventeen
years." She subsequently worked in a South Carolina textile mill
for almost nine months until she became disabled by byssinosis5
1. 276 S.C. 94, 275 S.E.2d 882 (1981).
2. Id. at 97, 275 S.E.2d at 884.
3. Hodges v. Workmen's Compensation Comm'r, 123 W. Va. 563, 17 S.E.2d 450
(1941); Zackary v. SWCC, 253 S.E.2d 532 (W. Va. 1979).
4. Record at 12.
5. Byssinosis or "cotton mill fever" is an occupational respiratory disease contracted
by cotton, flax and hemp workers. STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 207 (4th ed. 1976).
The causes and development of byssinosis, and the structural and functional changes
produced by the disease, are still the subject of scientific debate. 5A LAWyERS' MEDICAL
CYCLOPEDIA OF PERSONAL INJURIES AND ALLIED SPECIALTIES § 33.59a (1972 & Supp. 1976);
BOUHUYS, SCHOENBERG, BECK AND SHILLING, Epidemiology of Chronic Lung Disease in a
Cotton Mill Community, 5 TRAUMAnTc MEDICINE AND SURGERY FOR THE ArrORNEY 607
(Service VoL 1978); DicImE AND CHOSY, Some Important Occupational Diseases, 3 TRAu-
MATIC MEDICINE AND SURGERY FOR THE ATTORNEY 729, 742 (Service VoL 1975).
1
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and terminated her employment.6 Almost two years later, she
filed a Workmen's Compensation claim with the South Carolina
Industrial Commission. She had previously filed a similar claim
in North Carolina, which was dismissed because that state fol-
lows the "last injurious exposure" rule.7 The claimant's last ex-
posure to cotton dust had occurred in South Carolina.
A majority of the South Carolina Industrial Commission
found that the claimant had met the jurisdictional requirements
of the Act.8 The circuit court overruled the Commission's order,9
construing the Workmen's Compensation statutes ° to require
that an employee be exposed to the occupational hazard while
working in South Carolina for at least a one year period and
contract the disease during and as a direct result of that employ-
ment in order to receive benefits under the Act.1" The supreme
court reversed, reinstating the award.
1 2
Reaffirming its intention to liberally interpret the Work-
men's Compensation statutes in favor of the employee, 8 the
court enumerated three statutory requirements for compensa-
tion: (1) the existence of an occupational disease resulting di-
rectly from exposure in South Carolina to cotton dust peculiar
6. Claimant was employed by Springs Mills from May 12, 1975 until February 6,
1976. 276 S.C. at 99, 275 S.E.2d at 884.
7. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-57 (1979) states:
In any case where compensation is payable for an occupational disease, the
employer in whose employment the employee was last injuriously exposed to
the hazards of such disease, and the insurance carrier, if any, which was on the
risk when the employee was so last exposed under such employer, shall be.
liable.
For the purpose of this section when an employee has been exposed to the
hazards of asbestosis or silicosis for as much as 30 working days, or parts
thereof, within seven consecutive calendar months, such exposure shall be
deemed injurious but any less exposure shall not be deemed injurious; pro-
vided, however, that in the event an insurance carrier has been on the risk for
a period of time during which an employee has been injuriously exposed to the
hazards of asbestosis or silicosis, and if after insurance carrier goes off the risk
said employee is further exposed to the hazards of asbestosis or silicosis, al-
though not so exposed for a period of 30 days or parts thereof so as to consti-
tute a further injurious exposure, such carrier shall, nevertheless, be liable.
8. Record at 42.
9. Id. at 48-49.
10. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 42-11-10, -40, -60 (1976).
11. Record at 47.
12. 276 S.C. at 98, 275 S.E.2d at 884.
13. See, e.g., Hines v. Hendricks Canning Co., 263 S.C. 399, 211 S.E.2d 220 (1975);
Simpkins v. Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co., 200 S.C. 228, 20 S.E.2d 773 (1942).
[Vol. 34
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to the textile industry;14 (2) employment in the textile industry
for a period of at least one year; 15 and (3) contraction of the
disease while working for the employer.16 The court held that
the employee had satisfied these requirements since she had
worked for about eighteen years in the textile industry, had been
exposed to cotton dust while employed in South Carolina, and
had become disabled by the disease while employed for Spring
Mills.'7
The court's interpretation of the Act appears to alter the
plain language of the statute. The first of the three jurisdictional
requirements is contained in section 42-11-10 of the South Caro-
lina Code, which provides that a compensable occupational dis-
ease must "result directly and naturally" from exposure "in this
State .. ."Is In construing the section, the court eliminates the
required causal connection between the disease and employment
in South Carolina, holding instead that the claimant must
merely have been exposed to the occupational hazard "during"
his employment in the state.19
Section 42-11-40 contains the second requirement: the dis-
ease must have been "contracted" while in the employment of
"the employer."20 The term "contracted" lacks a statutory defi-
nition, and the only previous judicial interpretation is a negative
one. In Glenn v. Columbia Silica Sand Company,1 the supreme
court stated that because of the gradual and unknown progress
of pulmonary diseases, an employee could not equitably be held
to have contracted the disease for purposes of the statute before
its presence was medically diagnosed. 22 The divergence between
the actual physical contraction of a disease and its statutory
"contraction" is thus clearly established. Moreover, the Glenn
court specifically identified "disablement" as the compensable
statutory event which commenced the running of the statute of
14. S.C. CODE ANN. § 42-11-10 (Supp. 1980).
15. S.C. CODE ANN. § 42-11-60 (1976).
16. S.C. CODE ANN. § 42-11-40 (1976).
17. 276 S.C. at 98, 275 S.E.2d at 884.
18. S.C. CODE ANN. § 42-11-10 (1976).
19. 276 S.C. 98, 275 S.E.2d at 884.
20. S.C. CODE ANN. § 42-11-40 (1976).
21. 236 S.C. 13, 112 S.E.2d 711 (1960).
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limitations.23 The Vespers court, however, seems to have mis-
quoted Glenn for the proposition that the two terms are legally
identical.24 The statutory requirement is thus met under Ves-
pers if an employee becomes disabled or dies while in the em:
ploy of a particular employer, regardless of when the disease is
either actually contracted or later diagnosed.
The third and final requirement, contained in section 42-11-
60, is that the employee must have been exposed to disease-
causing dusts by his employment for a period of at least one
year.25 The Vespers court provides the first judicial construction
of this section, holding the language to require only a cumulative
period of one year "in the same type of employment" in any
state.26 In so doing, the court relied on Hodges v. Workmen's
Compensation Commissioner.27 In Hodges, the West Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals, construing a similar statute, 8 held
that the words "in the same employment" referred to the claim-
ant's employment in work of the same nature.29 Although all
employment occurred in West Virginia, the Hodges court noted
that the statutory language could not refer to the place where
the work was performed since that location could be constantly
changing.30 The court further reasoned that "an industrial dis-
23. 236 S.C. at 20, 112 S.E.2d at 715. S.C. CODE ANN. § 42-11-20 (1976) defines dis-
ablement as: "the event of an employee's becoming actually incapacitated, partially or
totally because of an occupational disease, from performing his work in the last occupa-
tion in which injuriously exposed to the hazards of such disease." See also, Taylor v. J.P.
Stevens & Co., 300 N.C. 944, 265 S.E.2d 144 (1950)(holding that the "time for making a
claim for an occupational disease runs from the time a claimant is notified by competent
medical authority of the nature and work-related quality of his disease. . . ." and that
disablement results when the claimant becomes incapable of working due to the occupa-
tional disease. Id. at 105, 265 S.E.2d at 150.
24. 276 S.C. at 97, 275 S.E.2d at 884. The dissent, adopting the opinion of the trial
court, concluded that the employee could not pursue her claim because the disease had
admittedly been diagnosed, and therefore contracted, in another state before she began
working in South Carolina. Id. at 99-102, 275 S.E.2d at 885-86.
25. S.C. CODE ANN. § 42-11-60 (1976).
26. The trial court had construed sections 42-11-60 and 42-11-10 together to require
a single continuous period of employment within the state of at least one year. 276 S.C.
at 102, 275 S.E.2d at 886. When the statute was amended in 1976, the length of exposure
was increased to require that the claimant, in order to recover for byssinosis, be exposed
to dust in his employment for a period of at least seven years. S.C. CODE ANN. § 42-11-60
(Supp. 1980).
27. 123 W. Va. 563, 17 S.E.2d 450 (1941).
28. W. VA. CODE § 23-65 (1931)(repealed 1945).
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ease arises from a lasting exposure due to physical surroundings;
not from the length of time spent with the same employer.
'3 1
The conclusion of both the West Virginia and South Caro-
lina courts appears to best effectuate the liberal compensatory
policy behind the Workmen's Compensation statutes.32 Occupa-
tional diseases almost invariably develop over an extended pe-
riod of time, and their exact cause or origin is often difficult to
identify. In addition, these diseases typically show a long history
of exposure without actual disability, culminating in the en-
forced cessation of work on a definite date.3 3 Although the impli-
cations raised by the dissent must be considered,u equitable
considerations dictate that an employee be allowed to recover
compensation benefits when he contracts an occupational dis-
ease resulting from exposure to hazards in his employment, re-
gardless of the length of employment in a specific state.
Wendy B. Harvey
31. Id. at 567, 17 S.E.2d at 453. The holding in Hodges is clarified by the recent
decision of Zachary v. SWCC, 253 S.E.2d 532 (W. Va. 1979), which interpreted a similar
occupational disease statute. The Zachary court held that a pulmonary disease claim-
ant's exposure to hazards must occur in his employment, which is not restricted solely to
employment within the state. Id. at 533-34.
32. The results in this area of workmen's compensation law are inconsistent, de-
pending not only on judicial construction, but also on the explicit wording of the particu-
lar statute at issue. For example, one court held that a section of an occupational disease
statute denying benefits to employees exposed to silicon dioxide for less than five years
in the state denied the claimant's right to equal protection because the exposure require-
ment had no reasonable relationship to a legitimate state objective. Stevenson v. Indus.
Comm'n. of Colorado, 190 Colo. 234, 545 P.2d 712 (1976). Other jurisdictions enforce
statutory provisions requiring a minimum amount of exposure within the state before
disability or death. See, e.g., Orosco v. Poach, 70 Ariz. 432, 222 P.2d 805 (1950), 70 Ariz.
227, 218 P.2d 875 (1950); Yocum v. Tinker, 514 S.W.2d 687 (Ky. 1974)(benefits denied).
Claims have also been denied in jurisdictions where the respective statutory exposure
requirements with the last employer for a specified time within the state are strictly
enforced. See, e.g., Ringeisen v. Insulation Services, Inc., 539 S.W.2d 621 (Mo. Ct App.
1976); Hogg v. Kehoe-Berg Coal Co., 174 Pa. Super. 388, 101 A.2d 168 (1953).
33. A. LARSON, THE LAw OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 95.21 (1981).
34. In his dissent, Justice Littlejohn adopted the order of the circuit court judge.
The trial court was concerned with the potential abuses of the Act by employees who
worked most of their lives in one state, and upon discovering they had contracted a
disease, moved to a neighboring state which provided greater statutory benefits. 276 S.C.
at 102. 275 S.E.2d at 886.
5
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B. Compensability of Recreational Injuries
In Smith v. Union Bleachery/Cone Mills,3 5 the South Caro-
lina Supreme Court held that injuries sustained by/an employee
while participating on a company-sponsored softball team did
not arise "out of and in the course of employment"36 and thus
were not compensable under the South Carolina Workmen's
Compensation Act.37 The decision reaffirms the court's position
that, absent a strong showing of employer involvement, partici-
pation on company teams is recreational activity and unrelated
to an employee's job.3
The defendant's employees formed a softball team, which
the defendant agreed to sponsor. The defendant's sponsorship of
the team was limited to furnishing uniforms and equipment,
helping the team to join a league, paying the league entrance fee,
and allowing organizational meetings on company time and
game notices on company bulletin boards. Defendant also reno-
vated a practice field for the team on company land. To comply
with league rules, uniforms had to bear defendant's name and
only company employees were allowed to participate.3 9
The plaintiff claimed workmen's compensation benefits for
a leg injury sustained while participating in a league softball
game at a public park. The trial judge denied her claim and held
that the injuries did not arise in and out of her course of em-
ployment with defendant.'0 In a 3-2 decision, the South Carolina
Supreme Court affirmed 41 the trial judge's decision. Basing its
decision on the factually similar case of Pate v. Plymouth Man-
ufacturing Co.,42 the court held that, as a matter of law,'4 defen-
35. 276 S.C. 454, 280 S.E.2d 52 (1981).
36. S.C. CODE ANN. § 42-1-160 (1976).
37. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 42-1-10 to -19, -40 (1976 & Supp. 1980).
38. 276 S.C. at 458, 280 S.E.2d at 54.
39. Id. at 456-57, 280 S.E.2d at 53-54.
40, Id. at 457, 280 S.E.2d at 54. The Industrial Commission granted plaintiff's claim
for benefits. Id. at 455, 280 S.E.2d at 53.
41. Id. at 458, 280 S.E.2d at 54.
42. 198 S.C. 159, 17 S.E.2d 146 (1941). In Pate, plaintiff was injured while returning
from a baseball game in which he had participated as a member of a team sponsored by
defendant. The team had been organized at the initiative of the employees, and defen-
dant's sponsorship was essentially limited to furnishing uniforms and equipment. Plain-
tiff's injury occurred after working hours and off defendant's premises. Id. at 162-63, 17
S.E.2d at 147-48. See infra notes 46 & 47 and accompanying text.
43. The court held that when the facts of injury are undisputed, the question of
[Vol. 34
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dant's involvement with the softball team was insufficient to
support a finding in plaintiff's favor.""
The court's reasoning in Pate and in Grice v. National Cash
Register Co.45 suggests that South Carolina has adopted the ma-
jority rule for determining the compensability of recreational in-
juries.46 Courts in a majority of jurisdictions consider four basic
criteria: (1) the time and place of both the activity and the in-
jury; (2) whether the recreational activity was organized and
conducted at the initiative of the employer or the employees; (3)
the amount of time, money, or equipment contributed by the
employer; and (4) the benefit accruing to the employer.47 Al-
though the court in Smith did not expressly adopt and apply the
majority rule, its broad reliance on Pate suggests its implied rec-
ognition of this approach.
Generally, the most consistent determinants of compen-
sability in majority jurisdictions have been the time and place of
a claimant's injury.48 If the injury occurs either on the em-
whether the injury arose out of and in the course of employment is a question of law.
The court then reviewed what it deemed to be the relevant facts and found that the
degree of defendant's involvement with the softball team was insufficient to justify im-
posing liability for plaintiff's injuries. 276 S.C. 456, 280 S.E.2d at 53 (citing Douglas v.
Spartan Mills, 245 S.C. 265, 140 S.E.2d 173 (1967)). For a discussion of the scope of
judicial review in cases in which the evidence is in dispute, see Administrative Law,
Annual Survey of South Carolina Law, 34 S.C.L. REv. - (1982).
44. 276 S.C. 458, 280 S.E.2d at 54.
45. 250 S.C. 1, 156 S.E.2d 321 (1967).
46. See id. at 5-6, 156 S.E.2d at 323-24; Pate v. Plymouth Mfg. Co., 198 S.C. at 164-
66, 17 S.E.2d at 148-49. For examples of recreational injury cases in other jurisdictions in
which similar tests have been applied, see, e.g., Truck Ins. Exch. v. Industrial Comm'n,
22 Ariz. App. 158, 524 P.2d 1331 (1974); McNamara v. Town of Hamden, 176 Conn. 547,
398 A.2d 1161 (1979); City Council v. Nevils, 149 Ga. App. 688, 255 S.E.2d 140 (1979).
47. The court's adoption of the first three criteria may reasonably be inferred from
its analysis of the facts and relevant authority in Pate. 198 S.C. at 164-66, 17 S.E.2d at
148-49. The court implicitly adopted the fourth criteria in Grice and noted that "general
benefits to the employer from social and recreational activities of its employees are not
sufficient alone to establish coverage under the [Workmen's Compensation] Act." Thus,
a more substantial, direct benefit to the employer apparently is required. 250 S.C. at 5,
156 S.E.2d 323. Although Grice concerned an injury sustained by an employee while
returning from a picnic, as opposed to a balgame, organized by employees, the court
found this distinction unimportant and cited Pate in support of its decision to deny
compensation to plaintiff. Id. at 6, 156 S.E.2d at 324. See generally A. CusTy, THE LAW
OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION IN SOUTH CAROLINA § 10.7.1 (1976).
48. 1A A. LARSoN, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 22.24 (1979)[hereinaf-
ter cited as A. LARsON]. See Stephenson v. Indus. Comm'n, 23 Ariz. App. 424, 533 P.2d
1161 (1975); Tocci v. Tessler & Weiss, Inc., 28 N.J. 582, 147 A.2d 783 (1959). Contra,
Long v. Gorham Corp., 100 R.I. 711, 219 A.2d 214 (1966).
7
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ployer's premises or during working hours, compensation is usu-
ally awarded.49 Absent these circumstances, however, benefits
are likely to be denied.50
The degree of employer initiative in organizing and con-
ducting the recreational activity has proven to be a less reliable
indicator of compensability. Although courts generally award
compensation when the employee was either paid or explicitly or
implicitly compelled51 to participate in the recreational activ-
ity,5 2 compensation has typically been denied when, as in Smith,
the recreational activity was organized entirely at the initiative
of the employees.
58
The degree of employer benefit from the recreational activ-
ity and the amount of time, money or equipment contributed by
the employer are normally addressed only after the first two cri-
teria have been considered.5 Generally, employer benefits
greater than the simple advertising on the backs of the team
uniforms found in Smith or improved employee health and mo-
rale are required to support compensation."
Similarly, an employer's financial support of the activity,
standing alone, is generally insufficient to justify an award of
benefits.56 Arguably, the indicia of employer involvement in
Smith-financial support plus allowance of organizational meet-
ing on company time, game notices on company bulletin boards,
and renovation of a practice field for the team on company
land-go beyond the scope of the general rule.57 The majority's
49. A. LARSON, supra note 48, at § 22.24.
50. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Indus. Conm'n, 23 Ariz. App. 179, 531 P.2d 555 (1975);
Martin v. Bonclarken Assembly, 296 N.C. 540, 251 S.E.2d 403 (1979). See Generally A.
LARSON, supra note 48, at § 21.21.(d).
51. E.g., Miles v. Montreal Baseball Club, 379 So.2d 1325 (Fla. App. 1980); Trav-
elers Ins. Co. v. Majersky, 531 S.W.2d 765 (Mo. App. 1975).
52. University of Denver v. Nemeth, 127 Colo. 385, 257 P.2d 423 (1953); Stakonis v.
United Advertising Co., 110 Conn. 284, 148 A. 334 (1930).
53. E.g., Wilson v. General Motors Corp., 298 N.Y. 468, 84 N.E.2d 781 (1949); Jack-
son v. Cowden Mfg. Co., 578 S.W.2d 259 (Ky. App. 1978).
54. See generally A. LARSON, supra note 48, at § 22.24.
55. E.g., Lindsay v. Public Serv. Co., 146 Colo. 579, 362 P.2d 407 (1961); Kuethe v.
State, 191 Neb. 167, 214 N.W.2d 380 (1974); Zuckerman v. Board of Educ., 35 A.D.2d
757, 314 N.Y.S,2d 814 (1970); Columbia Gas of Ohio, Inc. v. Sommer, 44 Ohio App.2d 69,
335 N.E.2d 743 (1974).
56. See, e.g., McFarland v. St. Louis Car Co. 262 S.W.2d 344 (Mo. App. 1953);
Padula v. Royal Plating & Polishing Co., 14 N.J. Super. 603, 82 A.2d 225 (1951).
57. Justice Ness argued in his dissent that this strengthening of facts was sufficient
[Vol. 34
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conclusion that even greater employer involvement must be
shown may represent an expansion of the general rule and sug-
gests that the court is employing a cautious approach in recrea-
tional injury cases.
The supreme court's decision in Smith impliedly reaffirms
South Carolina's adoption of the majority rule for determining
the compensability of recreational injuries under workmen's
compensation laws. The decision also indicates that the court's
policy of liberally construing this state's Workmen's Compensa-
tion Act in favor of employees 58 is limited in the area of recrea-
tional injuries; liability will not be imposed absent a clear rela-
tionship between the recreational activity and the claimant's
employment.
C. Termination of Children's Benefits
In Wilkes v. Chappell,59 the South Carolina Supreme Court
held that the conclusive presumption of a child's dependency on
a deceased employee created by the South Carolina Workmen's
Compensation Act 0 ceases when the child reaches age eighteen.
South Carolina thus joins the majority of American jurisdictions
by allowing termination of decedent's benefits when a child
reaches a specified age, unless the child is a full-time student or
is physically or mentally incapable of self-support. 1
Decedent was killed in the course of his employment with
to support an award of benefits. 276 S.C. at 458-61, 280 S.E.2d at 55-56.
58. Carter v. Penney Tire & Recapping Co., 261 S.C. 341, 200 S.E.2d 64 (1973);
Douglas v. Spartan Mills, 245 S.C. 265, 140 S.E.2d 173 (1967).
59. - S.C. -, 281 S.E.2d 485 (1981).
60. S.C. CODE ANN. § 42-9-110 (1976). This section provides that "[a] widow, a wid-
ower or a child shall be conclusively presumed to be wholly dependent for support on a
deceased employee." Id.
61. E.g., Mays v. Glens Falls Indemnity Co., 77 Ga. App. 332, 48 S.E.2d 550 (1948);
Carnegie-Illinois Steel Corp. v. Papuschak, 114 Ind. App. 233, 51 N.E.2d 875 (1943);
Theodore v. Packing Materials, Inc., 396 Mich. 152, 240 N.W.2d 255 (1976); Merchants
Trust Co. v. G. Sommers & Co., 200 Minn. 281, 274 N.W. 175 (1937); Franklin v. Jack-
son, 231 Miss. 497, 95 So.2d 794 (1957); Hewett v. Garrett, 274 N.C. 356, 163 S.E.2d 372
(1968); Medford v. State Acc. Ins. Fund, 42 Or. App. 51, 599 P.2d 1233 (1979); Marshall
v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 402 A.2d 575 (R.I. 1979); Basham v. R. H. Lowe,
Inc., 176 Va. 485, 11 S.E.2d 638 (1940). Contra, Allen v. St. Louis - S.F. Ry., 338 Mo. 395,
90 S.W.2d 1050 (1936); Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Crowley, 509 S.W.2d 939
(Tex. Civ. App. 1974). See generally, 2 A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSA-
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defendant in December of 1977. The plaintiff, the stepson of the
deceased, was under the age of eighteen at the time of the acci-
dent and was awarded survivor benefits. He subsequently
reached the age of eighteen and the benefits were terminated
upon his graduation from high school. In an action for reinstate-
ment of benefits, the trial court held that plaintiff's benefits
were vested and could not be divested, absent specific statutory
authority to the contrary.62 On appeal, the South Carolina Su-
preme Court reversed.
In reversing the decision of the lower court, the supreme
court held that the term "child," as used in section 42-9-110,63 is
defined as those persons who are under the age of eighteen or
wholly dependent upon the deceased employee." The court rea-
soned that because plaintiff was no longer under age eighteen,
the conclusive statutory presumption of dependency was no
longer applicable.6 5 The court further concluded that since no
evidence of mental or physical incapacity had been presented,
and the plaintiff did not plan to continue his education, he was
no longer dependent and, thus, not entitled to workmen's com-
pensation benefits.66
The supreme court has held that one of the primary pur-
poses of the Workmen's Compensation Act is to prevent depen-
dents from becoming charges upon society.67 The court in
Wilkes has apparently deemed this purpose satisfied when the
62. Record at 3. The Industrial Commission also had found benefits to be vested. Id.
at 2.
63. See supra note 60.
64. S.C. CODE ANN. § 42-1-70 (1976). The provisions of this section are made appli-
cable to section 42-9-110 through section 42-1-20. - S.C. -, 281 S.E.2d at 486, n.1.
65. - S.C. at -, 281 S.E.2d at 486.
66. - S.C. at.., 281 S.E.2d at 486-87. The court cited S.C. CODE ANN. § 42-9-290
(Supp. 1980) in reaching this conclusion. This section provides in pertinent part:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this Title, a dependent child en-
rolled as a full-time student in an accredited educational institution shall con-
tinue to receive benefits in accordance with this section until the age of
twenty-three years, subject to the five hundred week limitation. Any depen-
dent child mentally or physically incapable of self-support shall be paid bene-
fits for the full five hundred week period regardless of age.
Id. This section is similar to the provision for dependant's benefits in the federal Social
Security Act. 42 U.S.C. § 403(d)(1) (b)-(c)(1976).
67. Flemon v. Dickert-Keowee, Inc., 259 S.C. 99, 104, 190 S.E.2d 751, 753-54 (1972).
See Franklin v. Jackson, 231 Miss. 497, 503, 95 So.2d 794, 796 (1957); Marshall v. Kaiser
Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 402 A.2d 575, 580 (R.L 1979).
[Vol. 34
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dependent reaches age eighteen and is presumably capable of
self-support."' To lessen the harshness of the age restriction, ex-
ceptions are allowed when the claimant is a full-time student or
physically or mentally disabled.69
Wilkes clearly indicates that after reaching age eighteen,
dependents may not expect to receive survivor benefits under
the Act. It is incumbent upon employees and employers, there-
fore, to identify alternative methods of providing the supple-
mental income these dependents will need after reaching
majority.
Edmund Spencer Parris
II. SOUTH CAROLINA ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES ACT: THE
STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY DECISIONS
In 1977, the South Carolina legislature enacted the Model
Administrative Procedures Act (APA).70 Several recent cases"'
addressed the issue of the standard for judicial review of admin-
istrative agency decisions contained in section 1-23-380(g) of the
Act. Lark v. Bi-Lo, Inc.,7 2 the South Carolina Supreme Court's
first interpretation of this section, held that the statute estab-
lishes the substantial evidence rule as the appropriate standard.
In Guerard v. Whitner,73 the court, in holding that de novo re-
view of an administrative agency decision would violate the con-
stitutional requirement of separation of powers, reaffirmed its
intention to apply the substantial evidence standard.
In Lark, the Industrial Commission awarded compensation
to respondent Lark for a back injury that occurred while he was
working. On appeal, the circuit court applied the standard of re-
view for Industrial Commission decisions established by section
68. See Franklin, 231 Miss. at 503, 95 So.2d at 796 (citing Stanley v. McLendon, 220
Miss. 192, 70 So.2d 323 (1954); Marshall, 402 A.2d at 580.
69. - S.C. at -, 281 S.E.2d at 487.
70. MODEL STATE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES Acr, 14 U.L.A. 371-506 (1980)(codi-
fled in S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 1-23-310 to -400 (Supp. 1980))[hereinafter cited as MODEL
AcT].
71. Fast Stops, Inc. v. S.C. Alcoholic Beverage Control Comm'n, - S.C. -, 281
S.E.2d 118 (1981); Guerard v. Whitner, 276 S.C. 521, 280 S.E.2d 539 (1981); Ellis v. Spar-
tan Mills, 276 S.C. 216, 277 S.E.2d 590 (1981); and Lark v. Bi-Lo, Inc., 276 S.C. 130, 276
S.E.2d 304 (1981).
72. 276 S.C. 130, 276 S.E.2d 304 (1981).
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42-17-60"4 of the South Carolina Code, and affirmed the Com-
mission's decision. Prior to Lark, the supreme court had inter-
preted section 42-17-60 as requiring that an "award of the Com-
mission must be affirmed if there is any evidence to support
it. 17 5 Basing his decision on that rationale, the circuit court
judge upheld the Commission's decision, concluding that, al-
though it was extremely doubtful that Lark had sustained an
injury compensable under the Workmen's Compensation stat-
ute, 7  "the barest scintilla of evidence" supported the Commis-
sion's findings.77
On appeal, the supreme court found that because the Com-
mission was an agency within the contemplation of the APA,78
the appropriate standard of review would be that prescribed by
the APA rather than the one applied by the trial court.", The
court reasoned that South Carolina's adoption of section 1-23-
380(g) of the Act had impliedly repealed the scintilla standard
and replaced it with the "substantial evidence" standard of re-
view for agency decisions.80 The court defined substantial evi-
dence as:
[N]ot a mere scintilla of evidence nor the evidence viewed
blindly from one side of the case, but ... evidence which, con-
sidering the record as a whole, would allow reasonable minds to
reach the conclusion that the administrative agency reached or
must have reached in order to justify its action.81
Relying on the language of section 1-23-380(g) which states
that an agency's decision must be "clearly erroneous" before a
74. S.C. CODE ANN. § 42-17-60 (1976) provides, in part, that "Itihe award of the
Commission... shall be conclusive and binding as to all questions of fact.
75. 276 S.C. at 132, 276 S.E.2d at 305. See also, Willard v. Commissioners of Pub.
Works, 219 S.C. 477, 481, 65 S.E.2d 874, 876 (1951); Black v. Town of Springfield, 217
S.C. 413, 417, 60 S.E.2d 854, 856 (1950); Johnson v. Pratt, 200 S.C. 315, 330, 20 S.E.2d
865, 870 (1942); Murdaugh v. Robert Lee Constr. Co., 185 S.C. 497, 508, 194 S.E. 447, 452
(1937).
76. S.C. CODE ANN. § 42-1-160 (1976).
77. Record at 31.
78. S.C. CoDE ANN. § 1-23-310(1)(Supp. 1980) defines the term agency as "each
State board, commission, department or officer other than the legislature or the courts,
authorized by law to make rules or to determine contested cases."
79. 276 S.C. at 134, 276 S.E.2d at 306.
80. Id. at 135, 276 S.E.2d at 306.
81. Id. (quoting Law v. Richland County School Dist. No. 1, 270 S.C. 492, 495, 243
S.E.2d 192, 193 (1978)).
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court may reverse or modify it, 2 the court limited the applica-
tion of the substantial evidence rule to those situations in which
"a manifest or gross error of law has been committed by the ad-
ministrative agency."83 The court further indicated that the nar-
row scope of review was intended only to preclude abuses of del-
egated agency authority, and reversal was limited to those cases
in which "there is no reasonable probability that the facts could
be as related by a witness upon whose testimony the finding was
based."'" Concluding that the Commission's decision was sup-
ported by substantial evidence on the record, the court affirmed
the judgment of the trial court. 5
When the Model State Administrative Procedures Act was
revised in 1961, the original "substantial evidence rule" was
amended to provide a broader scope of judicial review.8 6 The
change was designed to place judicial review "of administrative
decisions of fact questions under the same principle as that ap-
plied under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in connection
with review of trial court decision. 8 7 Under the amended stan-
dard, "the reviewing court is given greater leeway to reverse an
agency's findings than under the former substantial evidence
test. The court will reverse if the findings ... are against the
clear weight of the evidence . . . even though there is evidence
[supporting the findings] that by itself, would be substantial.""8
82. S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-23-380(g)(5)(Supp. 1980).
83. 276 S.C. at 136, 276 S.E.2d at 307.
84. Id. (citing Independent Stave Co. v. Fulton, 251 Ark. 1086, 1088, 476 S.W.2d
792, 793 (1972). The court explicitly warned the bench to exercise caution in employing
the new standard and to avoid reversing any decision "upon which reasonable men might
differ."
85. Id. at 137, 276 S.E.2d at 307.
86. MODEL ACT § 15. Section 5-116(c)(7) of the 1981 Model State Administrative
Procedures Act returns to the substantial evidence standard for judicial review of deter-
minations of fact by an Agency. Id. § 5-116(c)(7)(Supp. 1982).
87. Id. The Hoover Commission Task Force on Legal Services and Procedure ob-
served that under the new "clearly erroneous" standard,
[t]he appellate court does not independently evaluate the evidence. Such prac-
tice would negate the importance of the trial court as the primary determiner
of fact issues. But, if the appellate court is convinced from the record that a
finding of a fact is clearly erroneous under the evidence, it will set that finding
aside.
F. COOPER, 2 STATE ADUMIuSTRATIVE LAW 730 (1965)(quoting COMMSSION ON ORGANIZA-
TION OF THE EXEcUTIvE BRANCH OF THE GOVERNMENT, TASK FORCE REPORT ON LEGAL SER-
VICES AND PROcEDuREs 217, 218 (1955).
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The South Carolina Legislature, in enacting the APA,
adopted the broader "clearly erroneous" standard of review."'
Nevertheless, the South Carolina Supreme Court applied a nar-
rower "limited substantial evidence" test in Lark, under which
an agency's decision will not be overturned unless it is not sup-
ported by substantial evidence and is clearly erroneous.90 The
court's determination that the Commission's decision was based
on substantial evidence, despite the circuit court judge's conclu-
sion that only the "barest thread of evidence" supported the ce-
cision, illustrates the narrowness of the South Carolina
standard."1
The significance of the court's decision in Lark remains un-
clear. Since Lark, the court has consistently applied the "limited
substantial evidence" standard to administrative agen-
cies,2 -even when, as in Lark, the standard conflicted with es-
tablished statutory and case law.93 Yet the exact scope of that
standard is uncertain. Although the court espouses a broader
scope of judicial review, it appears to apply a narrower standard
that more closely resembles the "scintilla" test than the sub-
stantial evidence test embodied in the APA.
538 (1978)(emphasis in original). Accord, Hayes v. Yount, 87 Wash. 2d 280, 286, 552 P.2d
1038, 1042 (1976).
89. In so doing, the legislature was in line with the majority of states that have
enacted administrative review acts. See, F. COOPER, supra note 87, at 730-31; 30 S.C.L.
REv. 1, 20-21 (1979).
90. 276 S.C. at 136, 276 S.E.2d at 307.
91. The standard the court adopted is much narrower than that which the legisla-
ture intended. Although the "scintilla" rule is no longer a valid standard of review, it is
unclear how much more evidence is necessary to avoid reversal of an agency decision. It
does appear to be less evidence than normally would be required under a "substantial
evidence" standard.
92. Since Lark, the court has applied the substantial evidence standard to the fol-
lowing agencies: (1) S.C. Alcoholic Beverage Control Commission, see, Schudel v. South
Carolina Alcoholic Beverage Control Comm'n., 276 S.C. 138, 276 S.E.2d 308 (1981); (2)
S.C. Coastal Council, see, Guerard v. Whitner, 276 S.C. 521, 280 S.E.2d 539 (1981). Other
agencies likely to be brought within the purview of the APA include the Public Service
Commission, the Department of Health and Environmental Control, the Highway De-
partment, and the Department of Social Services.
93. In Lark, the court held that the APA impliedly repealed a statutory standard of
review that was narrower than the "substantial evidence" rule. In Guerard v. Whitner,
the court held that "substantial evidence" was the appropriate standard of review even
though section 48-39-180 of the South Carolina Code provided for de novo review. In
Schudel, the court overruled a narrow standard of review that had been established for
the South Carolina Alcoholic Beverage Control Commission.
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In Guerard v. Whitner," defendant Whitner received a per-
mit to construct a marina on John's Island in Charleston County
from the South Carolina Coastal Council (Coastal Council).
Plaintiff and others challenged the Coastal Council's decision in
circuit court and requested a de novo review of the decision. The
circuit court denied de novo review, holding that the court's role
in such cases was to determine whether the decision of the ad-
ministrative body was supported by substantial evidence.95 Ap-
plying this standard, the circuit court affirmed the decision of
the Coastal Council. Plaintiffs appealed and the South Carolina
Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the circuit court.
On appeal to the supreme court, plaintiffs argued that the
de novo review provision of section 48-39-180 of the Coastal
Tidelands and Wetlands Act9 required the court "to hear wit-
nesses afresh and form its own opinion as to the matter. 9 7 The
court rejected this argument, holding that "in order not to of-
fend the constitutional requirement as to separation of powers,
statutes undertaking to give the courts de novo review of orders
of administrative bodies exercising non-judicial functions are
generally construed as providing only a limited review."' 8 The
supreme court did not decide whether the function of the
Coastal Council was judicial or legislative. It found instead that
"the coastal council as an administrative entity can function as
no more than a quasi-judicial body. . ... -9 The court then con-
cluded that the appropriate standard of review was the more
94. 276 S.C. 521, 280 S.E.2d 539 (1981).
95. Record at 493.
96. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 48-39-10 to -220 (Supp. 1980).
97. Brief for Appellant at 5.
98. 276 S.C. at 522, 280 S.E.2d at 540 (quoting Board of Bank Control v. Thomason,
236 S.C. 158, 165, 113 S.E.2d 544, 547 (1960)). In Thomason, the court construed a stat-
ute that arguably provided for de novo review of decisions as allowing only limited re-
view. The court reasoned that the Board of Bank Control performed a nonjudicial func-
tion in licensing small loan businesses and de novo review would violate the separation of
powers doctrine. For a discussion of Thomason, see Folk, Administrative Law, Annual
Survey of South Carolina Law, 13 S.C.L.Q. 31, 34-37 (1960).
99. 276 S.C. at 522-23, 280 S.E.2d at 540. The Coastal Council had argued that by
granting permits according to criteria established by the legislature, the Council served
an essentially nonjudicial function similar to that of a zoning board. Brief for Respon-
dents at 7-8. Functions of this nature generally have been construed as legislative. See,
e.g., Ball v. Jones, 272 Ala. 305, 132 So. 2d 120 (1961); Bentley v. Chastain, 242 Ga. 348,
249 S.E.2d 38 (1978); American Beauty Homes Corp. v. Louisville and Jefferson County
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limited substantial evidence standard of section 1-23-380(g) of
the Administrative Procedures Act.100
The decision in Guerard is based on the doctrine of separa-
tion of powers embodied in article I, section 8 of the South Car-
olina Constitution.101 Under this doctrine, legislative, judicial,
and executive branches of government have separate and dis-
tinct functions and courts are prohibited from performing non-
judicial functions."102 Thus, it would be clearly unconstitutional
for the legislature to directly delegate its authority to the court.
It would be equally unconstitutional for the legislature to do so
indirectly by granting a court the "power to review an exercise
of legislative power de novo. . . [because] the court [would be]
. . . substitut[ing] its own judgment for that of the administra-
tive agency ... "1,03
The Administrative Procedures Act arguably allows de novo
review. In section 1-23-380(a) of the Act, the legislature pro-
vided that "[tlhis section does not limit utilization of or the
scope of judicial review available under other means of review,
redress, relief or trial de novo provided by law."'  Notwith-
standing this language, the court's decision in Guerard to limit
review is clearly correct. De novo review was not "provided by
law" since the court had determined earlier in Board of Bank
Control v. Thomason10 5 that such review was unconstitutional.
This decision is consistent with the majority of other jurisdic-
100. The court's decision to limit the scope of review instead of holding the statute
unconstitutional is consistent with the approach taken by courts in a majority of states.
See 1 F. COOPER, STATE ADMINiSTRATVE LAW at 27 (1965); 4 K.C. DAviS, ADmINSTRATVE
LAW TREATISE, § 29.10 at 184 (1958); See, e.g., Rydd v. State Bd. of Health, 202 Kan.
721, 729, 451 P.2d 239, 246 (1969); Scott v. Nebraska ex. reL. Bd. of Nursing, 196 Neb.
681, 689, 244 N.W.2d 683, 688 (1976); Shaw v. Burleigh County, 286 N.W.2d 792 (N.D.
1979),
101. S.C. CONST. art. I, § 8 provides that "[i]n the government of this State, the
legislative, executive, and judicial powers of the government shall be forever separate
and distinct from each other, and no person or persons exercising the functions of one of
said departments shall assume or discharge the duties of any other."
102. Board of Bank Control v. Thomason, 236 S.C. at 165, 113 S.E.2d at 547.
103. Scott v. Nebraska ex rel. Bd. of Nursing, 196 Neb. at 688, 244 N.W.2d at 688
(1976).
104. S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-23o380(a)(Supp. 1980).
105. 236 S.C. 158, 113 S.E.2d 544 (1960). For a later case applying Thomason and
limiting the scope of review for decisions of school board, see Law v. Richland County
School District No. 1, 270 S.C. 492, 243 S.E.2d 192 (1978).
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tions that have dealt with the question.106 The court's decision
in Guerard to apply the substantial evidence standard rather
than permitting de novo review is well reasoned. By suggesting
that administrative agencies are quasi-judicial bodies, the court
seems prepared to apply the same standard to all agencies, re-
gardless of their characterization as judicial or legislative.07 Af-
ter Guerard, therefore, courts will probably interpret statutes
calling for de novo review of agency decisions as allowing only
application of the substantial evidence standard. 108
Jeffrey S. Hay
106. See, e.g., Ball v. Jones, 272 Ala. 305, 132 So. 2d 120 (1961); Lockard v. City of
Los Angeles, 33 Cal. 2d 453, 202 P.2d 38 (1949); DeMond v. Liquor Control Comm'n, 129
Conn. 642, 30 A.2d 547 (1943); Bentley v. Chastain, 242 Ga. 348, 249 S.E.2d 39 (1978);
West End Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Smith, 16 IMI. 2d 523, 158 N.E.2d 608 (1959); State
Bd. of Medical Registration and Examination v. Scherer, 221 Ind. 92, 46 N.E.2d 602
(1943); Rydd v. State Bd. of Health, 202 Kan. 721, 451 P.2d 239 (1969); American
Beauty Homes Corp. v. Louisville and Jefferson County Planning and Zoning Comm'n,
379 S.W.2d 450 (Ky. App. 1964); Dept. of Natural Resources v. Linchester Sand and
Gravel Corp., 274 Md. 211, 334 A.2d 514 (1975); Lesniak v. Fair Employment Practices
Comm'n, 364 Mich. 495, 111 N.W.2d 790 (1961); Reserve Mining Co. v. Herbst, -
Minn. -, 256 N.W.2d 808 (1977)(quoting, Steernerson v. Great Northern Ry., 69 Minn.
353, 72 N.W. 713 (1897)); Board of Trustees v. Acker, 326 So. 2d 799 (Miss. 1976); Scott
v. Nebraska ex. rel. Bd. of Nursing, 196 Neb. 681, 244 N.W.2d 683 (1976); Shaw v. Bur-
leigh County, 286 N.W.2d 792 (N.D. 1979); Huntington v. State Water Comm'n, 135 W.
Va. 568, 64 S.E.2d 225 (1951).
107. For a discussion supporting this approach, see Folk, supra note 98, at 35-36.
Folk states that the terms judicial, quasi-judicial, legislative, and quasi-legislative are
vague and have no real meaning. He argues that the same standard of review should be
used regardless of whether the function is classified as judicial or legislative. Id.
108. The supreme court did not indicate whether the jurisdictional fact doctrine,
under which the court has the power to review the entire record of decisions of the In-
dustrial Commission and decide for itself whether the Commission had jurisdiction over
a case, survives its decisions in Guerard. However, the doctrine probably is unaffected.
Brown v. Moorhead Oil Co., 239 S.C. 604, 124 S.E.2d 47 (1962) was decided after Thorn-
ason, supra note 105 and the court applied the doctrine without mentioning separation
of powers. This is perhaps because the doctrine does not affect the Commission's power
to decide a case but only whether it has jurisdiction. For other cases applying the juris-
dictional fact doctrine, see Adams v. Davidson-Paxon Co., 230 S.C. 532, 96 S.E.2d 566
(1957); Horton v. Baruch, 217 S.C. 48, 59 S.E.2d 545 (1950).
17
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